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INTRODUCTION  
Despite decisive progress in recent decades, 
much remains to be done in terms of 
inequalities between the sexes within the EU. 
Most data converge to confirm that women 
continue to bear the greater burden of domestic 
tasks and childcare. For most women, 
combining a career and family life remains a 
huge challenge.2 Women also care for older 
dependants more often than men do. Another 
famous inequality concerns wages: there is still a 
significant pay gap between women and men. 
Women are underrepresented in decision-
making processes and positions, particularly at 
the highest level. This is not due to a lack of 
competence, for women count for half of the 
workforce and more than half of new university 
graduates in the EU. Women are also 
disproportionately more likely to be victims of 
all forms of domestic violence – including 
physical violence, sexual harassment, rape, 
sexual violence and harmful customary or 
traditional practices such as female genital 
mutilation, forced marriage and honour crimes. 
About 20% to 25% of women have experienced 
physical violence. An overwhelming majority of 
‘single parent families’ are single women with 
children. This situation tendentiously leads to 
impoverishment, precariousness, difficulties in 
the job market and less good physical and 
mental health. One can legitimately wonder: 
what does the EU actually do to eliminate such 
injustices? 
This policy brief looks at the EU approach to 
gender from a critical perspective: after being at 
the vanguard of several advances in the fight 
against discrimination, the EU seems to have 
become less efficient in that field. On the other 
hand, it has integrated and promoted the 
mainstream view that gender stereotypes should 
be the main target of policy-makers in resolving 
the injustices affecting women. As a result, the 
EU experts on that topic seem to abide by a 
very ‘constructivist’ approach that distinguishes 
them from the essentialist and ‘differentialist’ 
For several decades, the European 
Union has been at the forefront of 
significant progress in the struggle 
towards equality between women and 
men, among others in the fight against 
sex-based discriminations. The 
contemporary EU approach to gender 
has however become much more 
interested in representations and social 
norms. This paper analyses this stance 
and highlights its deficiencies – more 
specifically, it looks at the flaws entailed 
in an excessive focus on “gender 
stereotypes”. Finally, it briefly sketches 
out the principles of an alternative.   
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view which has been very much revived in the 
media and even in part of the academic literature 
on women in recent decades. After briefly 
analysing this view, we will point at several of its 
deficiencies. Finally, we will rapidly sketch the 
general principles of an alternative perspective 
on this issue, which should avoid the 
constructivist trap as well as that of essentialism.  
THE EU APPROACH TO GENDER  
From a legal fight against discrimination...  
The EU has been at the forefront of the fight 
against discrimination based on gender (and on 
ethnic, religious or cultural grounds) for the last 
four decades. A strong legal basis exists in that 
field.3 The 1957 Treaty of Rome already 
emphasized the principle of equal pay for equal 
work. (Article 119 EEC, then 141 EC, now 
Article 157 TFEU). In 1976, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) added a social 
aim to Article 119 EEC. And indeed, from 1976 
onwards, the EU adopted several directives 
tackling gender-based discrimination: this 
legislation concerned equal opportunities and 
equal treatment of men and women in the 
labour market and in social security, parental 
leave and on the safety and health at work of 
pregnant workers and workers who have 
recently given birth or are breastfeeding. With 
the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the 
promotion of equality between men and women 
became one of the essential tasks of the 
European Community (Article 2 EC) and the 
EU received the competence to combat further 
discrimination based on gender (Article 13(1) 
EC, now 19(1) TFEU). The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
prohibits discrimination on any grounds, 
including sex, (Article 21) and highlights the 
necessity of positive action in that respect 
(Article 23). In the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), 
equality between men and women was declared 
part of the common values of the EU (Article 2 
TEU). Promoting equality between men and 
women also appears among the tasks of the 
Union (Article 3(3) TEU).  
In 2010, the Commission adopted a strategy for 
equality between women and men (2010–2015). 
It outlined six priority areas: equal economic 
independence for women and men; equal pay 
for work of equal value; equality in decision-
making; dignity, integrity and ending gender 
violence; promoting gender equality beyond the 
EU and horizontal issues.4  
Several instruments were put in place to 
implement this strategy. For instance, the 
European Commission has allocated about €8 
million to projects preventing and struggling 
against violence committed against women and 
girls within the EU.5 In addition, the victims’ 
rights directive was recently adopted: it 
guarantees a minimum level of rights for victims 
across the Union: the right to clear and 
understandable information on proceedings, the 
ability to participate actively in criminal 
proceedings and the benefit of victim support 
services.6  
An assessment of this strategy shows that it has 
led to a better knowledge of the various 
dimensions of gender inequalities, to a greater 
awareness within the population and policy-
makers of the necessity to address gender 
inequalities, and the elaboration of models and 
indicators in favour of gender mainstreaming. 
However, some evaluations have also 
highlighted the fact that progress has been 
uneven across the priority objectives.7 The 
achievements have been greater in the better 
focused priority areas, like gender equality in 
decision-making and violence against women. 
Two main defects have been highlighted in 
these assessments: first, a lack of sufficient 
resources for effective implementation, because 
no budget has been earmarked for the strategy; 
second, the obvious deficiency caused by the 
weak institutionalization of gender 
mainstreaming in the EU decision-making 
process. Overall, the strategy seems to have 
produced positive effects regarding agenda 
setting, innovation and learning dimensions, but 
much less in terms of practical change. And 
indeed, the Gender Equality Index 2015 of the 
European Institute for Gender Equality shows 
only marginal progress towards gender equality 
between 2005 and 2015.8  
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In this respect, it might be useful to note that on 
the legislative front, not enough has been 
achieved over the last few years. For example, in 
November 2012, the European Commission 
proposed a draft directive imposing a quota of 
40% women among non-executive directors of 
companies listed on stock exchanges by 2020. 
The bill has been approved with amendments by 
the Parliament but is still under discussion in the 
Council.9 On the other hand, the maternity leave 
directive proposal, presented for the first time 
by the Commission in 2008, has not been 
adopted after the co-legislators – Parliament and 
Council – could not reach an agreement. The 
Commission has decided to withdraw the 
initiative in order to put an end to the current 
stalemate and open up the way for new 
initiatives.10 It might be useful to note that the 
withdrawal of this directive took place as a 
consequence of its agenda for ‘better regulation’. 
The latter has indeed pushed the Commission to 
get rid of 80 legislative propositions, using the 
argument that it is necessary to cut ‘red tape’ 
and to reduce the number of European 
regulations. For some, this is proof of the 
deepening of an economically liberal agenda, 
while others perceive this orientation as a 
response to the eurosceptic arguments against 
the ‘Brussels bureaucratic monster’. 
Therefore, the struggle for more equality 
between the sexes seems to have somewhat 
stagnated at the European level, although so 
much remains to be done. I would now like to 
concentrate, in a critical way, on one of the main 
focuses of the EU in dealing with this crucial 
matter. 
...To a focus on stereotypes  
For the last two decades, one approach has 
become largely hegemonic in policy circles as 
well as among academics working towards 
equality between the sexes, namely an approach 
focused on the elimination of ‘gender 
stereotypes’, perceived as the main cause of both 
apparent differences in behaviour and 
preferences according to sex, and of the 
enduring inequalities between them. This vision 
seems to have penetrated the work done at the 
European level, particularly when it promotes 
‘soft law’ or awareness-raising. More specifically, 
it pervades most of the recent reports and 
resolutions emanating from the European 
Parliament and the European Commission.  
A first characteristic of this general approach to 
gender is to oppose the reproduction of 
prevailing clichés of the feminine and masculine. 
These presumptions are very broadly defined. 
For instance, we are told that boys are educated 
to focus on the outside world, while girls are 
supposed to be more suited to the domestic 
world, and that this is not neutral. Girls are also 
said to be taught to accept authority, while boys 
are expected to challenge it11.  Other stereotypes 
viewed as problematic involve limiting girls to a 
future role as mothers or putting too much 
emphasis on their appearance, and not 
introducing boys to qualities and skills such as 
emotional literacy or domestic tasks.12 
In addition, these very broadly defined 
stereotypes are seen as explaining the different 
roles socially attributed to individuals according 
to their sex. For example, we are told that 
‘Traditional gender roles and stereotypes still 
exert a great deal of influence over the division 
of labour in the home, in education, in careers, 
in the workplace and in society in general.’13 The 
target of criticism is very much the education 
system: ‘educational institutions that practice 
gender segregation, and education materials 
often contain stereotypes that help to perpetuate 
the traditional separate roles assigned to girls 
and boys.’14 We are also told that ‘gender 
stereotypes assign different, determined and 
limited roles to women and men’ and that ‘these 
roles are . . . disseminated or reproduced by 
parents, education and media . . . integrated by 
individuals during the socialisation phases of 
childhood and adolescence and therefore 
influence their lives and might limit women’s 
and men’s personal development.’15 These 
stereotypes are said not only to ‘influence 
choices throughout their lives’ but also to have 
‘strong implications for the labour market, 
where women still face both horizontal and 
vertical segregation.’ In the end, this ‘contributes 
to certain sectors still being considered “male” 
and their pay levels consequently being higher 
than those of sectors considered “female”.’16 
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Not only is this difference believed to be 
generated by gender stereotypes that are viewed 
as unilaterally negative, but all positive 
discourses on difference are also disparaged as 
being part of a form of ‘benevolent sexism’ 
rooted in a naturalist discourse. By this, 
researchers and policy-makers mean, for 
instance, the postulates according to which 
women are expected to be able to encourage a 
new, more ‘feminine’ style of governance, based 
on intuition, empathy or the ability to negotiate. 
This approach is criticized because it tends to 
limit women to particular functions and tasks.17 
Lastly, these gender clichés are perceived as the 
main causal factor explaining pervasive 
inequalities between women and men. Thus, we 
read that ‘Gender roles continue to influence 
crucial individual decisions: on education, on 
career paths, on working arrangements, on 
family and on fertility. These decisions in turn 
have an impact on the economy and society. It 
would therefore be in everyone’s interest to 
offer genuine choices equally for women and 
men throughout the different stages of their 
lives.’18 We also read that ‘Gender stereotypes 
and traditional structures have a negative impact 
on health and universal access to sexual and 
reproductive health and the associated rights.’19 
These stereotypes are very much attributed to 
different sorts of education given to children: 
‘little boys and little girls do not learn the same 
things at school; by the same token, men and 
women are not treated equally in life.’21 For 
example, the gender pay gap, in addition to 
being due to discrimination (not the same pay 
for the same work) is also partly attributed to 
the fact that women and men still tend to work 
in different sectors and jobs, and that women 
spend more time raising children and looking 
after the household.22 In other words, what 
explains remaining inequalities between the 
sexes ‘has to do with stereotypes which 
legitimize inequalities, with men and women 
frozen in their respective complementary roles 
based on their expected behaviors and bound by 
formal “rules” they cannot infringe.’20  
‘Gender neutrality’ and education 
Certainly, the contemporary EU approach to 
dealing with inequalities between women and 
men still includes classical recommendations for 
public policies, such as creating more affordable 
and flexible childcare and family services or 
imposing quotas for the representation of 
women in top positions. However, over the past 
few years, many recommendations have tended 
to focus on breaking stereotypes – and this is 
perhaps linked to the relative inefficiency of the 
‘hard law’ perspective. Huge emphasis is now 
put on the necessity to ‘change mentality’ and, 
more specifically, to modify our general 
categories for the ‘feminine’. 
Even the eradication of violence against women 
is said to require a struggle against stereotypes: 
‘in order to effectively combat violence against 
women and impunity, a change of attitude 
towards women and girls is necessary in society, 
where women are too often represented in 
subordinate roles.’ Thus, in addition to 
punishing offenders and supporting women’s 
shelters and organisations working to support 
women who are victims of gender-based 
violence, it would also be necessary to combat 
gender stereotypes and discriminatory socio-
cultural attitudes from an early age onwards.23 
The Parliament also calls on the Commission 
and the Member States ‘to raise awareness of 
stereotypes, sexism and traditional gender roles 
in the education and media sector’ and to 
promote a balanced, non-stereotyped image of 
women.24 This quest for ‘gender neutrality’ can 
sometimes sound like a very forceful goal: 
‘challenging representational systems and driving 
out (from birth but especially in schools) 
anything which encapsulates so-called “male” 
and “female” behaviour.’25. 
The solutions proposed suppose an involvement 
of public authorities in education policies, in 
order to create a more neutral approach to 
gender in the way teaching is carried out, in 
curricula and in the manner in which teachers 
are trained. Public authorities are asked to 
promote courses about and research into the 
significance and scope of gender equality as part 
of tertiary education, notably by including 
gender-equality-related subjects in syllabuses, 
introducing specific postgraduate courses and 
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furthering specialist studies and research in the 
field.26 European and national authorities are 
encouraged to foster gender equality in 
educational institutions and to see gender 
education as a fundamental part of the 
curriculum and school programmes; in line with 
the Istanbul Convention, Member States are 
pushed to include teaching on non-stereotyped 
gender roles.27 In the same perspective, girls and 
boys should be encouraged to take an equal 
interest in all subjects, beyond gender prejudices. 
For instance, girls should be incited to study 
scientific and technical subjects, while boys 
should learn about activities usually perceived as 
feminine, such as domestic work and care. 
Member States are also asked to eliminate 
stereotypes and sexist distortions from 
textbooks in order to change the behaviour and 
identity of girls and boys, and to develop or 
reinforce national regulations fighting against 
stereotyped gender roles in the media and 
advertising.28 
PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS  
This vision has been very much disparaged by 
the opponents of ‘gender theory’ in a somewhat 
over-the-top and apocalyptic way. These 
opponents have lumped together various 
intellectual and militant movements, which they 
all presume to abide by the same political 
project, namely the abolition of sexual 
differences, the promotion of a new 
postmodern approach not only to gender but 
also to sexuality, and the encouragement of 
feminist visions – all perceived as anti-men – 
and of homosexual and transsexual rights and 
visions alike.29  
Without falling into such caricatures and 
approximations, it might be useful to question 
some of the assumptions pervading mainstream 
views on gender. In other words, the long-term 
objective in that field should be to invent a 
‘third way’ between radical constructivism and 
radical essentialism. And for that purpose, the 
notion of difference between the sexes has to be 
totally refurbished. But first, let us examine the 
limitations of the mainstream approach to 
gender. 
Firstly, the causal link postulated in this view 
between, on one hand, gender stereotypes, and 
on the other, differences and inequalities 
between the sexes is extremely problematic. This 
link is always a postulate from which other 
arguments follow but it is never proved.30 It is 
assumed that stereotypes actually explain both 
differences and inequalities between women and 
men (the two often being amalgamated as we 
have just seen earlier). Nonetheless, this 
assumption cannot be easily demonstrated. 
Since boys and girls and women and men 
continue to be educated and socialized 
differently, it remains largely impossible to 
assess the extent of the innate versus the 
constructed parts of the ‘feminine’ and 
‘masculine’ clichés. Of course, one can show 
that there is a distinct socialization according to 
sex, but one cannot prove that the origin of this 
distinction lies in these stereotypes. Essentialists 
could indeed retort that if we raise boys and girls 
differently it is because of deeper and more 
fundamental biological differences. They would 
therefore reverse the causality. For them, 
stereotypes are not the cause of behavioural 
differences but instead derive from them as the 
product of innate differences. What is actually 
proven by recent research is the impact of 
socialization on preferences, behaviours and 
abilities. But again, that does not mean that 
prevailing ideas about the ‘feminine’ and the 
‘masculine’ are causal factors either for the 
differences or for the inequalities between the 
genders.  
In the end, by being ourselves immersed in our 
society (and socialised like every other average 
individual), we are all inevitably imbued with 
these stereotypes. Therefore it seems a logical 
and empirical impossibility to either prove or 
disprove the causal effect of gender stereotypes 
on behaviours and mentalities. If one adds to 
that the impact of socialization on biology 
(through the plasticity of our brains31 and 
genes32), much research on this issue then loses 
most of its relevance: even if one admitted the 
causal impact of stereotypes on differences and 
inequalities between the sexes, one would then 
have to take into account the impact they would 
have not only on behaviours and mentalities but 
also on actual biology. This would then make it 
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even harder to reverse such an impact. This 
question relates to the problematic solutions 
proposed by the supporters of the gender 
approach, to which we will return in a moment. 
Secondly, this vision deploys a generally negative 
and unilateral vision of differences between the 
sexes, as being either an equivalent to or 
necessarily leading to inequalities. Yet, what 
progressives should be attacking is injustices in 
general and, more particularly, relations of 
domination that contradict individual freedoms, 
not differences as such.  
The focus on the alternative between unity and 
diversity or identity and differences has become 
a widespread one in social sciences as well as in 
public debates at least since the 1970s. This is 
what some have called the ‘cultural turn’. The 
ascent of new social movements, issues and 
claims seemed to question the old materialistic 
framework of progressives and incite them to 
work on post-materialistic issues. Post-
structuralism and postmodern visions have been 
part of that movement. This intellectual 
evolution in Western progressive thought had an 
impact on the approach to gender. The work of 
Judith Butler in particular seemed to embody 
this new preoccupation with a radically 
constructivist approach in which sex – and not 
just gender – was perceived as a social 
construction, a perspective according to which 
the more widespread the differences the better, 
as long as it was the outcome of a free individual 
choice. On the flip side of this polemic, a more 
conservative view has gained ground for the last 
decades, which, although radically distinct from 
an ideological point of view, does share 
common points with Butler’s constructivist 
approach. Indeed, the opponents to radical 
constructivism have been trying to revive a sort 
of essentialist approach to gender, according to 
which differences between the sexes are not the 
product of social norms but rooted instead in 
innate biological differences. In this camp, too, 
the focus is on differences, albeit in a more rigid, 
essentialist and conservative view. 
The mainstream approach to gender has been 
partly influenced by the radical constructivist 
camp but its main focus now seems to be with 
eliminating socially constructed differences, 
perceived as inherently linked to inequalities. 
Yet, a unilaterally negative approach to 
differences between the sexes is very unlikely to 
find an echo among the average – male and 
female – population, since most individuals do 
seem to think not only that there are irreducible 
differences between men and women but also 
that this is a positive thing. The challenge is 
therefore to elaborate a vision that would clearly 
go against relations of domination without 
discarding the existence of such differences. It is 
about voicing a vision of the ‘feminine’ (and the 
‘masculine’) which would enable women to get 
involved in their own liberation as well as the 
struggle for freedom in general, a sort of 
‘emancipatory differentialism’. 
A third flaw of this approach lies in the 
alternative propositions it makes for attaining 
equality between men and women. The very 
strong focus on an alternative education reflects 
a sort of idealistic bias and presents the potential 
danger of perfectionism - I am using here the 
philosophical definitions of these terms. The 
mainstream approach to gender is indeed 
idealistic in a classical sense: it supposes, first of 
all, that ideational factors – beliefs, 
representations, ideas – are the causal factors for 
real inequalities between men and women; and 
secondly, it proposes solutions specifically aimed 
at changing these representations.33 By doing so, 
it tends to overlook relations of power justified 
by these representations as well as more 
objective – material or biological – factors 
potentially contributing to these inequalities.  
Furthermore, these propositions entail the risk 
of ‘perfectionism’34: by pushing for a new sort of 
‘gender-free’ society and by using school 
curricula to convey these new perspectives, they 
run the risk of justifying the imposition by the 
state over a whole population of a specific 
‘conception of the good’, perceived as inherently 
superior. To be told what it should mean or not 
mean to be a girl or a boy could indeed run 
counter to the individual freedom to build one’s 
own vision of the good. Certainly, questioning 
gender-based socialisation could increase the 
freedom of individuals by liberating them from 
pre-established expectations and categories. 
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Nonetheless, pushing for a radical end to the 
categories of the ‘feminine’ and the ‘masculine’ 
results in a reverse, but still dogmatic, trap.  
CONCLUSION: FROM GENDER TO 
FREEDOM  
This paper has attempted to highlight some of 
the limitations of the approach that currently 
prevails in the European institutions about the 
inequalities between women and men. As we 
have seen, the classical anti-discrimination 
perspective has reached its limitations in the 
fight against the many injustices still affecting 
women. Furthermore, the ‘hard law’ approach 
achieved through legislative propositions seems 
to have become secondary compared to a more 
‘soft law’ perspective. This has gone hand in 
hand with a lack of resources allocated to the 
objective of reducing inequalities between the 
sexes. On the other hand, a very strong focus on 
gender stereotypes has become visible in the EU 
institutions’ take on this issue. Yet, as we have 
shown, this notion is problematic in many 
respects.  
I would now like to outline a few potential 
alternative principles to this approach. Because 
of lack of space and because I have tackled this 
dimension in other publications, I will sketch 
these points only briefly. 
First of all, it is important to recognize the 
validity and legitimacy of measures intended to 
act upon mentalities and representations. 
Nonetheless, the way in which this symbolic 
work is carried out has to be questioned. Indeed, 
it would be very idealistic to suppose that 
consensual representations can be transformed 
mainly through education and alternative 
discourses. Such a view grants a transformative 
power to ideas, whereas these impact on reality 
only when they connect to interests and take 
into account structural and material constraints. 
In other words, it is an illusion to think that 
gender stereotypes are the cause of the injustices 
affecting women, in the same way that it is 
mistaken to believe that removing them will 
magically eradicate these injustices.  
Gender stereotypes are problematic in so far as 
they contribute to justifying or reinforcing 
existing inequalities35. But they are not 
necessarily the reasons for the latter. Any 
attempt to prove that these clichés are the actual 
causal factors for dominations or inequalities 
affecting women will always fail since, on the 
one hand, the subjects tested are always 
themselves socialised into the mainstream views 
of the ‘feminine’ and the ‘masculine’ and, on the 
other, socialisation does not leave the mind nor 
even the body untouched – as shown by recent 
data on cerebral plasticity and epigenetics. In the 
end, the debate between what is innate or 
constructed when it comes to differences 
between the sexes is simply impossible to settle. 
And, most importantly, this narrow controversy 
leads us to overlook what should be the true 
priority – namely, building the conditions for 
effective freedom for all. This presupposes the 
denunciation of discourses that legitimise 
women’s inferiority but does not necessarily 
postulate that those narratives actually create 
such disadvantages.  
Furthermore, a credible vision for female 
emancipation also requires the adoption of a far 
more propositional than merely critical stance. If 
women are to support the measures contributing 
to render them less vulnerable, there should be a 
persuasive and appealing long-term project that 
is not limited to criticisms. And this alternative 
project cannot only consist of getting rid of 
stereotypes. Such a project needs to put the goal 
of individual freedom at the forefront and not 
exclude the hypothesis that there might indeed 
be some inextricable differences between the 
sexes. It is fundamental to stress that 
differentialist discourses that support or justify 
domination are the problem, not differences as 
such. In other words: a new and appealing 
project for women should articulate general 
principles of justice rather than focus on the 
opposition between difference and similarity. A 
narrative built around the principle of effective 
freedom could accommodate the various needs 
of contemporary women without counteracting 
their deeply held conviction that they still 
remain different from men. Being free to 
elaborate and put in practice your own vision of 
the good and your own choice of life projects 
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does not contradict the belief that there might 
be differences between the sexes beyond purely 
biological ones. But it does necessitate 
overcoming the general objectification of 
women. This aspect is present in many clichés 
of the ‘feminine’ and needs to be questioned, 
because if women are perceived and conceive of 
themselves as being merely objects or 
instruments to others’ needs, purposes and ends, 
they will never engage in struggles for their own 
freedom or the liberty of other individuals. To 
fight for your own freedom, you first need to 
imagine yourself in the position of a free and 
autonomous subject able to decide their own 
fate. Nonetheless, counteracting such gender 
clichés does not mean getting rid of the idea that 
women want to remain feminine or continue to 
correspond to some form of female ideal. It just 
means that they have to start thinking outside 
the boxes and categories imposed on them 
through socialization. And this task should be 
followed by men as well, at least by those who 
feel constrained by the equally restrictive 
dominant definition of the ‘masculine’. 
In practical terms, this quest for freedom could 
lead to the implementation of specific measures 
in the educational system, but in a more open 
and flexible way than that currently promoted in 
the field: questioning the link between 
stereotypes and the lack of freedom or 
justification of inferiorities and disadvantages is 
one thing, promoting role reversals or a ‘gender 
free’ society is another. In that respect, 
perfectionist biases should be avoided: it is not 
up to public authorities to impose a specific 
vision of the good on individuals, whether 
through school curricula or other means. This 
objective does require forceful and constraining 
measures but not regarding representations: 
further measures – such as quotas, for instance, 
but not just them – should be implemented for 
women to reach the same positions as men in 
social, economic and political fields. This would 
suppose legislative and financial measures above 
and beyond what is being done at the moment, 
whether in the Member States directly or at the 
EU level. 
But for this policy work to be pushed further, 
there will need to be mobilization on the part of 
women themselves. This can only happen 
through convincing alternative projects and 
discourses. Nevertheless, it is important to recall 
that ideas and representations do not float in a 
void. They matter only to the extent that they 
are closely connected to interests and take 
structures into account. In this case, new ideas 
will create results only if they take material 
factors into account and if they match the 
interests of the persons concerned – namely, a 
majority of women. Thus, the material and 
structural constraints in which most women find 
themselves will make them more or less 
responsive to the alternatives proposed. The 
social contexts that impel women to live 
different lives from men and to experience 
specific forms of injustices inevitably lead them 
to behave and to see things differently. As 
already discussed, this might even have an 
impact on their biology. Besides, structural 
constraints also entail biological differences 
which are impossible to refute and very much 
affect women’s lives: their likelihood of getting 
pregnant and delivering children or their general 
physical vulnerability, for instance. Those 
differences should inform not only the content 
of measures directed at emancipating women 
but also the discourses carrying those measures.  
Finally, women will only be mobilised to 
support practical measures improving their 
existence if they are accompanied by a discourse 
reflecting their perceived interest. This means 
that an alternative project has to speak to the 
selfish drives of women as much as to their 
ideals, principles or selfless orientations. One 
should therefore contest the very fashionable 
cliché of a supposedly greater and more innate 
female empathy. Most research on that topic has 
in fact shown that, if selflessness is natural and 
probably an evolutionary necessity, it tends to 
deploy itself in close, interpersonal circles, while 
selfish reflexes are likely to prevail in thinking or 
acting at a more general level such as the socio-
political one.35 Put differently: like other human 
beings, women should remember that they are 
also driven by selfish motives, particularly when 
it comes to supporting collective actions and 
policies.  
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